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Arbitrability In Nebraska
After this Article went to press, the Nebraska Supreme Court
predictably held the "future disputes" provisions of the Ne-
braska Uniform Arbitration Act unconstitutional in State v.
Nebraska Association of Public Employees, 239 Neb. 653, 477
N.W.2d 577 (1991). The decision supports some conclusions in
the text as to Nebraska law, but gives little insight on other
important current issues. It is discussed in the Epilogue in
Part V.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, executory arbitration provisions have been unenforce-
able under Nebraska law.1 However, an award following submission
by the parties is judicially enforceable. 2
There is Nebraska Supreme Court dictum, stated in 1985 in Over-
land Constructors v. Millard School District,3 that agreements to arbi-
trate an existing dispute (as distinguished from future disputes) are
enforceable under Nebraska law. But that dictum relied exclusively
upon cases in which an award had been made,4 contains no mention of
the distinction between an executory agreement to arbitrate and an
1. This Article updates and draws upon an earlier study of Nebraska law. Grad-
wohl, Historical Perspectives On Nebraska Law Concerning Arbitration Agree-
ments, 58 NEB. L. REv. 438 (1979). It also draws upon J. GRADWOHL, The
Applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to Individual Employment Con-
tracts, Ch. 11 in CRrrICAL IsSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 255 (Vause ed.
1990).
2. Babb v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 271, 233 Neb. 826, 833, 448
N.W.2d 168, 172 (1989):
An award, whether under the statute or common law, is, in the ab-
sence of fraud or mistake, prima facie binding on the parties thereto, and
the burden of alleging and proving its invalidity rests upon the party
seeking to set aside the decision. The general policy of the courts is that
an arbitration award should not be set aside as inequitable unless it is
grossly excessive and shocks the conscience of the court.
See also Simpson v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 455-56, 232 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1975);
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 69 N.W. 118, 119 (1896).
3. 220 Neb. 220, 224-25, 369 N.W.2d 69, 73 (1985)(citations omitted)(emphasis in
original):
While this court is supportive of parties resolving their differences
through arbitration, if possible, we have consistently held that an arbi-
tration agreement entered into before a dispute arises, denying to the
parties their right to seek the assistance of the courts, is contrary to pub-
lic policy and is not enforceable. In a long line of cases .... we have
consistently held that a contract to compel parties to arbitrate future
disputes and, thus, to oust the courts of jurisdiction to settle such dis-
putes is against public policy and is void.... The School District directs
our attention to the cases of Simpson v. Simpson and Knigge v. Knigge in
support of its contention that arbitration clauses are enforceable. It ne-
glects, however, to note the significant distinction in both Simpson and
Knigge. In each of those cases a dispute had already arisen and the par-
ties agreed to submit their known dispute to arbitration. In such cases
we do enforce the decision growing out of the arbitration proceeding.
The distinction is whether the agreement to submit to arbitration is en-
tered into before the dispute arises and before the parties know the na-
ture and extent of their dispute or whether it is entered into after the
dispute has arisen and at a time when the parties are aware of the nature
of the dispute and have agreed to a method of resolving that dispute.
4. Knigge v. Knigge, 204 Neb. 421, 282 N.W.2d 581 (1979)(appraisal of the petroleum
engineer hired jointly by the parties to marital dissolution proceedings, and
whose appraisal the parties had stipulated they would accept as correct, was held
to be binding); Simpson v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 232 N.W.2d 132 (1975)(the
award of appraisers pursuant to an agreement for dissolution of a partnership
was enforceable).
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award,5 and finds no support in any reported holding of the Nebraska
Supreme Court.6
The Nebraska Legislature enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act
with modifications ("Nebraska Act") in 1987, 7 despite an Opinion of
the Attorney General that the sections dealing with executory agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes are invalid under the Nebraska
Constitution.8 Cases involving the underlying constitutionality of the
Nebraska Act are pending in the Nebraska Supreme Court.9
The Federal Arbitration Act ("Federal Act")Io preempts state law
as to arbitrability when the Federal Act is applicable." The contract
generally remains a state law matter, but enforceability of the arbitra-
tion agreement involves federal substantive law.12 Given an expan-
sive application of the Federal Act to "a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce,"' 3 the Federal Act may constitute
the legal basis for the enforceability of many Nebraska arbitration
agreements.
The purpose of this Article is to provide an explanation and analy-
sis of the applicability of state and federal rules as they relate to the
enforceability of Nebraska agreements containing an obligation to ar-
bitrate a disagreement.
II. COVERAGE OF THE NEBRASKA ACT
A. Section 25-2602 In General
Section 25-2602 of the Nebraska Act modifies the language of the
5. Actually, in Overland Constructors, there had been a determination by the archi-
tect pursuant to the arbitration provision. The opinion seems to be in error on
two points: (1) the dictum attributed to prior holdings that executory agreements
to arbitrate existing disputes are enforceable and (2) in failing to give effect to the
arbitration award of the architect in this particular dispute.
6. There has been no reported Nebraska decision in which an executory agreement
to arbitrate an existing dispute has been held enforceable against an attempted
revocation. A common law submission to arbitration was revocable after the arbi-
tration hearing, but prior to issuance of the award. Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280,
68 N.W. 496 (1896).
7. L.B. 71,1987 Neb. Laws 259 (codified as amended at NMa. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to
25-2622 (1989)).
8. 87029 Op. Att'y Gen, 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1142 (1987).
9. State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, No. 89-737 (Neb. July 6, 1989); Cun-
ningham v. State, No. 89-733 (Neb. July 5, 1989)(stayed on appeal).
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ I to 14 (1988).
11. The substantive nature and preemptive effect of the Federal Act stem from
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See inkfra
text accompanying notes 86-92.
12. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Volt Information Sciences v. Board of
Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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Uniform Arbitration Act ("Uniform Act"),14 which is patterned after
the Federal Act'5 as to the validity of an arbitration agreement. The
first sentence of section 25-2602 deals with "existing" controversies
and uses the same language as the Uniform Act. Its second sentence
changes the provisions on "future" disputes.
Section 25-2602 expressly covers employment agreements, like the
Uniform Act. Arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments fall primarily under the authority of the federal Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.16 The Federal Arbitration Act excludes from its
coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce,"' 7 although some individual employment arrangements are
covered by the Federal Act.' 8
Section 25-2602 applies only to written arbitration agreements, and
specifies that contract provisions control over the Nebraska Act. Sec-
tion 25-2602 also coordinates the Nebraska Act with some other Ne-
braska statutes authorizing arbitration.
Section 25-2602 states:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract. A provision in a written contract
to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the par-
ties, other than a claim arising out of personal injury based on contract or tort,
is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract, if the provision (a) is entered into
voluntarily and willingly and (b) is not a part of a contract of adhesion, such as
a standard installment loan contract, a consumer credit application, a credit
card application, or an insurance contract except as provided in section 44-811.
The Uniform Arbitration Act also applies to agreements between employers
14. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955):
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitra-
tion or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any con-
troversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration agree-
ments between employers and employees or between their respective
representatives [unless otherwise provided in the agreement].
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a con-
tract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
16. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
18. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Perry v.
Thomas, 479 U.S. 982 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 132-44.
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and employees or between their respective representatives. Contract provi-
sions agreed to by the parties shall control over contrary provisions of the
Uniform Arbitration Act. A claim for workers' compensation shall not be
subject to arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act. When a conflict
exists, the Uniform Act shall not apply to sections 48-811, 54-404 to 54-406, 60-
2701 to 60-2709, 70-1301 to 70-1329, and 86-408 to 86-410 and the Uniform Act
on Interstate Arbitration and Compromise of Death Taxes.1 9
B. Existing Controversies
Section 25-2602 authorizes a written agreement to submit "any ex-
isting controversy" to arbitration. The only exceptions contained in
the statute are "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract," workers' compensation claims, and conflicts
with the arbitration provisions of other specified statutes.
Since the first Territorial Legislature in 1855, Nebraska has had
formal statutory procedures for the voluntary submission of "all con-
troversies which might be the subject of civil actions" to arbitration.20
If the statutory procedures were followed, the submission was not rev-
ocable by one party alone,21 but that provision was not tested constitu-
tionally. Those statutes were repealed in the enactment of the
Nebraska Act.22 A common law submission to arbitration outside the
statutory procedures was revocable prior to an award.23
The language in Overland Constructors, and in the two arbitration
decisions since then,24 indicates that an executory agreement to arbi-
trate an existing controversy might be enforceable today. This is sim-
ply language in the three opinions, however. The Nebraska Supreme
Court has never actually decided a case on that basis, nor has it dis-
cussed the constitutional or policy distinctions between agreements to
arbitrate existing controversies and agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes. The Nebraska Attorney General's Opinion took the language
of Overland Constructors literally in advising that "an agreement to
arbitrate an existing dispute is permissible."25
In Overland Constructors, the court appears to have invalidated an
19. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2602 (1989).
20. See Gradwohl, supra note 1, at 443-46.
21. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2109 (1985)(repealed 1987).
22. LB 71, 1987 Neb. Laws § 25, at 266.
23. Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280, 68 N.W. 496 (1896)(present dispute concerning
pledged watch allegedly lost through negligence of pledgee submitted to three
arbitrators; following the arbitration hearing, one party learned that two of the
three arbitrators favored his opponent and revoked the submission agreement).
See Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90,149 N.W. 309 (1914)(common law submis-
sion irrevocable when signed decision placed in envelope for delivery to the
parties).
24. Babb v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 271, 233 Neb. 826, 448
N.W.2d 168 (1989); Rawlings v. Amco Ins. Co., 231 Neb. 874, 438 N.W.2d 769
(1989).
25. 87029 Op. Att'y Gen., 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1142, 1143, & 1146 (1987).
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arbitration agreement after an award had been made. The issue
framed was "whether parties are bound by the determination made by
the architect pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the con-
tract documents."26 The court's statement of facts shows: (1) that
"[w]hen the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, the architect
pursuant to the contract documents, determined" the issue, (2) that
the parties disagreed with the architect's determination and a meeting
was held, and (3) that the architect modified its earlier determina-
tion.2 7 Nevertheless, the court held that, "In the instant case the
agreement to arbitrate was entered into before the dispute arose and is
therefore unenforceable." 28 If this interpretation is correct, then the
arbitration of an "existing" controversy pursuant to an agreement to
arbitrate "future" disputes would be unenforceable, even after the
award has been made.
Rawlings v. Amco Insurance Co. 2 9 involved a provision in an insur-
ance policy which provided that the amount of the loss be set by ap-
praisal. Amco argued that there is a distinction between an
arbitration clause covering liability issues and one limited to damages
only. In rejecting that argument, the court stated: "Both aspects of
the contract are subject to judicial resolution, and any predispute ef-
fort to bind the parties to forego resort to the courts on either issue
ousts the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction."30
In Babb v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 271,31 the
court enforced an arbitration award of the UFCW International Exec-
utive Committee. The opinion contains strong language that
"[a]rbitration agreements entered into before a dispute arises which
purport to deny the parties the right to resort to the courts nonethe-
less oust the courts of their jurisdiction and are thus against public
policy and therefore void and unenforceable." 32 But the court ex-
plained that "the agreement between Babb and the successor union to
submit the termination issue to arbitration was voluntary and arose
after the dispute."33 In fact, Babb had voluntarily submitted his claim
to arbitration on March 19, 1985, pursuant to an agreement executed
August 12, 1983 (effective September 1, 1983). The arbitration provi-
sion stated that controversies arising out of the agreement must be
26. Overland Constructors v. Millard School Dist., 220 Neb. 220, 224 369 N.W. 2d 69,
73 (1985).
27. Id- at 223, 369 N.W.2d at 72.
28. Id. at 225, 369 N.W.2d at 73.
29. 231 Neb. 874, 438 N.W.2d 769 (1989).
30. Id at 876, 438 N.W.2d at 771.
31. 233 Neb. 826, 448 N.W.2d 168 (1989).
32. Id. at 832, 448 N.W.2d at 172.
33. Id at 832-33, 448 N.W.2d at 172. But what difference should it make whether the
award was issued under an agreement to arbitrate "future disputes" or an "ex-
isting controversy"?
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submitted to the UFCW International Executive Committee for a fi-
nal and binding decision.34 Thus, unlike Overland Constructors, Babb
held enforceable an award under a preexisting "future disputes"
agreement.
There is still no decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court involving
a party who expressly agreed to arbitrate an existing controversy, but
who later attempted to revoke the submission prior to an award.
Rawlings involved a "future disputes" provision. Babb involved an
award based upon what the court characterized as an "exsting*' dis-
pute provision. And, despite its dictum, Overland Constructors denied
effect to the architect's determination.
What has taken place is that since 1985 the -court has spoken as if
an executory agreement to arbitrate an existing controversy is en-
forceable under Nebraska law. But the court has not directly ana-
lyzed the issue, and there is no decisional authority specifically
supporting the statements. Further, the court has not addressed the
questions whether (1) an executory agreement to arbitrate an "ex-
isting controversyj' pursuant to a prior "future disputes" agreement is
enforceable undei Nebraska law, and (2) if so, at what point the ac-
tions of the parties, pursuant to a "future disputes" agreement, consti-
tute an agreement to arbitrate an "existing controversy."
C. Future Disputes
1. Effect of an Award
Apart from the Nebraska Act, it would seem that any award fol-
lowing proper arbitration procedures is no longer revocable, whether
entered pursuant to a "future disputes" agreement or an "existing
controversy" agreement. Like an accord and satisfaction, "[a]t com-
mon law an award acts as a merger upon the original claims upon
which it is predicated whenever a new duty is created thereby."35
The language in recent decisions is not completely clear on this
issue, however. Overland Constructors denied effect to the architect's
determination, which would certainly appear to have been an award.36
And in giving effect to an award, Babb stressed that the agreement "to
submit the termination issue to arbitration was voluntary and arose
after the dispute,"37 even though the arbitration decision was pursu-
34. Id at 828, 448 N.W.2d at 169-70.
35. Bentley v. Davis, 21 Neb. 685, 688, 33 N.W. 473, 474 (1887).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
37. Babb v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 271, 233 Neb. 826, 832-33, 448
N.W.2d 168, 172 (1989). The opinion added-
Babb voluntarily requested and invoked the arbitration procedure of
the merger agreement in his March 19, 1985, letter to the international
union. He was not forced to arbitrate by the successor union. The suc-
cessor union acquiesced in Babb's invocation of the arbitration process.
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ant to a "future disputes" agreement. 38
The court also has not focused recently upon the time at which an
award becomes effective. 39 A 1983 per curiam decision held that a pro-
vision in a collective bargaining agreement, which provided that "[t]he
decision of the personnel board shall be final and binding upon the
City,"40 was an agreement "to arbitrate future disputes and thus to
oust the courts of jurisdiction to settle such disputes."41 The court so
held even though the personnel board had conducted a hearing and
made a decision.42 In holding that the arbitration agreement "is
against public policy and is void,"43 the opinion cites only a case involv-
ing a wholly executory arbitration clause contained in an insurance
policy.44 And both decisions are cited in Overland Constructors for
the statement "we have consistently held that a contract to compel
parties to arbitrate future disputes, and, thus, to oust the courts of
jurisdiction to settle such disputes is against public policy and is
void."45
The court stated in Babb that a statutory or common law award is
"prima fade binding" in the absence of fraud or mistake and "should
not be set aside as inequitable unless it is grossly excessive and shocks
the conscience of the court."46 The Nebraska Act solidifies the en-
forceability of awards, making written agreements "valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable," 47 and limiting the judicial grounds for denying con-
firmation,48 vacating,49 and modifying or correctingO an award.
Id- at 833, 448 N.W.2d at 172.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
39. See supra note 23 for early Nebraska decisions and supra note 4 for decisions
enforcing the determinations of appraisers.
40. City of Lincoln v. Soukup, 215 Neb. 732, 734, 340 N.W.2d 420, 421 (1983).
41. Id at 736, 340 N.W.2d at 423.
42. Id- at 733, 340 N.W.2d at 421.
43. Id at 736, 340 N.W.2d at 423.
44. Id at 736, 340 N.W.2d at 423 (citing Heisner v. Jones, 184 Neb. 602, 169 N.W.2d 606
(1969)).
45. Overland Constructors v. Millard School Dist., 220 Neb. 220, 224, 369 N.W.2d 69,
73 (1985)(emphasis in original)(original text set out supra note 3).
46. Babb v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 271, 233 Neb. 826, 833, 448
N.W.2d 168, 172 (1989). See supra note 2 for complete statement of the court.
47. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2602 (1989).
48. I& § 25-2612:
Within sixty days of the application of a party, the court shall confirm an
award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are
urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case
the court shall proceed as provided in sections 25-2613 and 25-2614.
49. Ia § 25-2613(a):
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award
when:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neu-
[Vol. 70:381
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2. Constitutionality
There is presently no judicial indication that the authorization in
section 25-2602 for the enforceability of executory agreements to arbi-
trate future disputes between the parties will be held constitutional.
The most recent Nebraska Supreme Court statement in 1989 was sim-
ply: "Arbitration agreements entered into before a dispute arises
which purport to deny the parties the right to resort to the courts
nonetheless oust the courts of their jurisdiction and are thus against
public policy and therefore void and unenforceable." 51
The Attorney General's Opinion advised the Legislature that the
future disputes provisions are unconstitutional.52 The Opinion ex-
amined the standards for district court review of an arbitrator's deci-
sion and stated:
Under the standards for judicial review set out above, a District Court review-
ing an arbitration decision... under LB 71 could in no way consider the merits
of the controversy, and would be limited, in great part, to questions concern-
ing fraud or partiality. In our view, those standards are so narrow as to effec-
tively deny parties to the arbitration the assistance of the courts. Therefore,
we believe that ... the general arbitration provisions of LB 71 are unconstitu-
tional. We would note, however, that LB 71 would be constitutional to the
extent that it is applied to agreements for arbitration of ezisting controversies
tral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the
rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor, refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the pro-
visions of section 25-2606, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not ad-
versely determined in proceedings under section 25-2603, and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objec-
tion.
The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be
granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing
to confirm the award.
50. I& § 25-2614(a):
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a
copy of the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the
award when:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mis-
take in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in
the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy.
51. Babb v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 271, 233 Neb. 826, 832, 448
N.W.2d 168, 172 (1989).
52. 87029 Op. Att'y Gen., 1 NEB. LEGIs. J. 1142 (1987).
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under Section 2 of that bill.5 3
The District Court for Lancaster County has held future disputes pro-
visions unconstitutional in two cases presently on appeal to the
supreme court.54
As originally introduced, the language of LB 71 was identical to the
Uniform Act, covering both existing controversies and future dis-
putes.5 5 The Legislature altered that language by floor amendment,5 6
with the changes relating to future disputes intended to insure the vol-
untariness of an agreement and help establish the constitutionality of
the statute.
LB 71 eventually passed on a vote of forty-one to zero.5 7 The Bill's
principal sponsor apparently persuaded other legislators with the
forceful arguments that arbitration agreements represent sound pub-
lic policy; that the Legislature can properly determine public policy;
that the legislative determination of policy might induce the Nebraska
Supreme Court to change its prior holdings in this respect; that the
statute insures the voluntariness of agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes; that the standards for judicial review are constitutionally suffi-
cient under the Nebraska Constitution; and that arbitration is firmly
embraced throughout the United States.5 8 Of course, the Nebraska
Supreme Court, itself, has stated that the settlement of disputes by
arbitration represents sound public policy.5 9 But those statements ap-
pear in situations where the process has been followed voluntarily to
an award. Up to that point, the court has held that agreements to arbi-
trate are revocable by either party.
Further, the court's statement of the basis for judicial review of a
53. Id at 1145-46 (emphasis in original text).
54. State v. Nebraska Assoc. of Pub. Employees, Doe. 433, Page 194 (Neb. D. Lancas-
ter County April 10, 1989); Cunningham v. State, Doc. 434, Page 29 (Neb. D. Lan-
caster County May 22, 1989).
55. LB 71, 90th Legis., 1st Sess., § 2 (1987).
56. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 935, 969 (1987).
57. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1201-02 (1987)(the vote was 41 affirmative, 0 negative, 4 present
and not voting, and 4 excused and not voting.).
58. Floor debate on LB 71, 90th Legis., 1st Sess. 1952 (1987) statements of Senator
David M. Landis. Senator Landis concluded: "The intent of this legislation [is] to
give clear knowledge that the Legislature is now saying that arbitration is not
violative of public policy, that we embrace this as a form of public policy." Id.
59. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 194 Neb. 453, 455-56, 232 N.W.2d 132, 136
(1975)(quoting Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 745, 69 N.W. 118,
119 (1896)(emphasis omitted)):
An arbitration agreement is used as a convenient tool to settle disputes
without going to court and to promote the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. The grounds for impeachment of the agreement and the decision
of the arbitrators are necessarily narrow, in order to accomplish the pub-
lic policy objective of an arbitration agreement.
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common law arbitration award 0 seems broader than the grounds for
vacating an award under the Nebraska Act.61 Both allow review for
matters of fraud or mistake. However, the common law review addi-
tionally allows at least a peek at the merits in that an award can be set
aside if "it is grossly excessive and shocks the conscience of the
court."62 Because arbitration is contractual, a court can determine
under both the statute and common law whether the award falls
within the scope of the agreement between the parties.
3. Voluntariness/Contract of Adhesion
The Legislature added provisions on voluntariness and contract of
adhesion by floor amendment.63 However, absent the amendment,
the substance of those provisions might have fallen within the lan-
guage "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Proponents viewed the amendment as a
response to concerns expressed at the committee hearing, and during
floor consideration, that arbitration could be forced on a party in an
unequal bargaining position.64
Those requirements are included only in the sentence on "future
disputes," which was split off from the single sentence contained in
the Bill as introduced and as in the Uniform Act. This would seem to
infer that agreements relating to "future disputes" will be subject to
greater judicial scrutiny as to voluntariness and equality of bargaining
position than agreements relating to an "existing controversy."
Other states have also added statutory exceptions to the language
of the Uniform Act for contracts of adhesion, insurance, and con-
sumer-type papers.65 However, the phrase "entered into voluntarily
and willingly" appears to be a Nebraska innovation.66 It remains to be
seen how courts will interpret the phrase "voluntarily and willingly"
with respect to arbitration provisions buried in lengthy documents,
such as a standard form construction or architect's contract,67 an em-
60. See supra note 2 for a statement of the rule. See also Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating
& Equip. Co. v. S.I.D. No. 337, 232 Neb. 377, 440 N.W.2d 488 (1989).
61. See supra note 49 for the statutory grounds.
62. See supra note 2.
63. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 935, 969 (1987).
64. The Attorney General also advised the Legislature that "the arbitration provi-
sions contained in LB 71 would apply only to agreements to arbitrate entered into
voluntarily by the parties." Op. Att'y Gen., 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1183 (1987).
65. See UNiF. ARBITRATION Acr § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6-8 (1985 ed. & Supp. 1990).
66. For a recent federal requirement that a waiver of a right or claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act be "knowing and voluntary," see infra note
116.
67. See, e.g., Overland Constructors v. Millard School Dist., 220 Neb. 220, 369 N.W.2d
69 (1985).
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ployment agreement in the securities industry,68 or a franchise
agreement.69
4. Personal Injury Claims
Some states have also modified the language of the Uniform Act
with respect to personal injury or tort claims.70 Nebraska adopted the
language "other than a claim arising out of personal injury based on
contract or tort" from Montana's 1985 enactment.7 ' This language
was initially placed in the "existing controversy" sentence by the floor
amendment,72 but was later moved to the "future disputes"
sentence.73
D. Employment Agreements
Adopting the Uniform Act language, section 25-2602 applies "to ar-
bitration agreements between employers and employees or between
their respective representatives." 74 The primary effect of that lan-
guage is to provide clear statutory authority, in addition to the provi-
sions in the general Industrial Relations Act,75 for Nebraska public
employers to enter into arbitration arrangements as the impasse reso-
lution method for contractual grievance procedures. In general, the
power of public entities to sue and be sued constitutes authority to
voluntarily settle an existing controversy by arbitration.76
Private sector collective bargaining agreements are covered by the
federal Labor Management Relations Act. The substantive source of
authority for arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment is the Labor Management Relations Act, rather than the Federal
Arbitration Act.77
68. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
70. See UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6-8 (1985 ed. & Supp. 1990).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(a)(1990).
72. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 935, 969 (1987).
73. 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1079 (1987).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816(2)(1988). See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-816(4), 48-837
(1988). As introduced in 1987, the State Employees Collective Bargaining Act
contained specific provisions for binding arbitration agreements. LB 661, 1987
Neb. Laws, §§ 18, 24-25. The provisions were not included in the Committee's
substitute Bill reported to the floor. See 1987 NEB. LEGIs. J. 1028 (1987)(Commit-
tee amendments 0539). This was due to coverage under the Nebraska Uniform
Arbitration Act. See Hearings on LB 661 Before the Committee on Business and
Labor, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. 37, 42 (1987)(statement of Senator Jerome Warner).
76. Hughes v. Sarpy County, 97 Neb. 90, 149 N.W. 309 (1914)(county bound by arbitra-
tion award).
77. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657 (1991). Although
the Court has not directly applied the Federal Arbitration Act to collective bar-
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Some private sector individual employment arrangements are
within the scope of the Federal Act.78 Individual employment agree-
ments are covered by section 25-2602, but Nebraska agreements for
arbitration of "future disputes" will be subject to careful examination
with respect to issues of voluntariness and equality of bargaining
position.
The Nebraska Act added a provision prohibiting the Commission of
Industrial Relations from ordering "that any party under its jurisdic-
tion submit to, or contract to submit to, arbitration."79 The District
Court for Lancaster County has held that the report of a Special
Master under the State Employees Collective Bargaining Act is not
enforceable under the Nebraska Act.80
E. Statutory Claims
Determination of whether an agreement s' to arbitrate a statutory
claim is binding involves a matter of statutory interpretation of both
the Nebraska Act and the subject matter statute. As a general propo-
sition, it would seem that agreements to arbitrate claims arising under
Nebraska statutes would be valid and enforceable to the same extent
as arbitration agreements generally. The authority for such an arbi-
tration agreement might be found in a statute providing for arbitra-
gaining agreements, it has noted that "the federal courts have often looked to the
Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases." See United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). See also American Postal Workers
Union v. Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 211, 214 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
79. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2618(b)(1989). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-810.01 (1988)(public
employers "cannot be compelled to enter into any contract or agreement, written
or otherwise, with any labor. organization concerning grievances, labor disputes,
rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work"). *
80. State Code Agencies Educ. Ass'n v. State, Doc. 426, Page 210 (Neb. D. Lancaster
County Apr. 8, 1988).
81. The absence of an agreement would raise Nebraska constitutional issues of dele-
gation of authority and procedural due process, in addition to the open court re-
quirement. See 87029 Op. Att'y Gen., 1 NEB. LEGIS. J. 1142, 1144-45
(1987)(discussion of proposed Special Master provisions of LB 661, State Employ-
ees Collective Bargaining Act). The Attorney General also considered unconsti-
tutional a Bill providing that construction liens under $10,000 shall be subject to
arbitration under the Nebraska Act. See 88009 Op. Att'y Gen., 1 NEB. LEGIS. J.
986 (1988). See also Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988)(in-
validating provisions in the child support referee statutes). The "herd laws" were
held constitutional on the basis that the arbitration provisions were not an exclu-
sive remedy but were cumulative to common law rights determinable in a court.
Randall v. Gross, 67 Neb. 255, 93 N.W. 223 (1903). But the court held that the
"fence viewers" law ousted district courts of general common law jurisdiction by
virtue of a provision that "if disputes arise between the owners of adjoining lands
concerning the proportion of fence to be made or maintained by either of them,
such disputes shall be settled by fence viewers." Schnakenberg v. Schroeder, 219
Neb. 813, 814, 820, 367 N.W.2d 692, 695-96 (1985).
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tion of that claim,82 the Nebraska Act,83 or even the Federal Act.84
Section 25-2602 of the Nebraska Act states that "[a] claim for work-
ers' compensation shall not be subject to arbitration under the Uni-
form Arbitration Act." It also provides that when a conflict exists
with several other statutes pertaining to arbitration of a claim,85 the
Nebraska Act shall not apply. Additionally, courts may have to re-
solve situations in which the subject matter statute provides exclusive
procedures for enforcement or may warrant a strong public policy of
exclusivity, such as the employment discrimination statutes or the
public employment bargaining impasse resolution sections of the In-
dustrial Relations Act.
III. COVERAGE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Preemptive Substantive Law
The Federal Act provides that written arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."8 6 Since
the 1967 decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,87
that language has been considered federal substantive law which
preempts conflicting state law. It does not constitute an independent
grant of federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts.88 But it
82. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 54-404 to 54-406 (1988)(herd law).
83. Section 25-2602 of the Nebraska Act refers to "any existing controversy" and "any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties." Additionally, the references
to other statutes gives a clear inference that section 25-2602 includes agreements
to arbitrate Nebraska statutory claims.
84. For examples of cases in which the Federal Act has provided substantive author-
ity to arbitrate a state statutory claim, see infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
85. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-811 (1988)(assessment association "bylaws for arbitrating
any claim for loss or damage"), 54404 to 54-406 (1988)(herd law), 60-2701 to 60-
2709 (1988)(motor vehicle manufacturer's warranties), 70-1301 to 70-1329
(1990)(arbitration of wholesale electric charge disputes), 77-3301 to 77-3316
(1990) (interstate arbitration of death taxes), 86-408 to 86-410 (1987)(arbitration of
price to be paid for telephone system).
86. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See supra note 15 for complete text of statute.
87. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
88. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983):
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law estab-
lishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it
does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise. Section 4 provides for
an order compelling arbitration only when the federal district court
would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute; hence,
there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis
for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.... Section 3 likewise
limits the federal courts to the extent that a federal court cannot stay a
suit pending before it unless there is such a suit in existence. Neverthe-
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does constitute substantive law which is controlling in both federal
and state courts.8 9 The earlier Nebraska determination in Wilson &
Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,90 that the Federal Act is procedural
rather than substantive law, would be different today following Prima
Paint and later decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Despite federal preemption over state rules limiting arbitrability,
the contract containing arbitration provisions generally remains a
state law matter. It is only that portion of state law denying or limit-
ing the enforceability which is preempted and does not apply. There
are two important aspects of this preemption: (1) state rules denying
or limiting the enforceability of an arbitration agreement according to
its terms are preempted; and (2) "in applying general state-law princi-
ples of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration
agreement within the scope of the act .... due regard must be given to
the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope
of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration."9 1 A
corollary would be that the issue of whether the arbitration clause,
less, although enforcement of the Act is left in large part to the state
courts, it nevertheless represents federal policy to be vindicated by the
federal courts where otherwise appropriate.
89. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)(citations omitted):
"Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create
a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbi-
tration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp. Enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl.3, this body of substantive
law is enforceable in both state and federal courts. Southland Corp. v.
Keating (Sec. 2 held to pre-empt a provision of the California Franchise
Investment Law that California courts had interpreted to require judi-
cial consideration of claims arising under that law). As we stated in
Keating, "[i]n enacting Sec. 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a na-
tional policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the con-
tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." "Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements." Section 2, therefore, embodies a clear federal pol-
icy of requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part
of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. Sec. 2.
90. 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951). A headnote
of the court states:
Where arbitration constitutes a part of the contract between parties to it
and an attempt is made to enforce arbitration by invoking the Federal
Arbitration Act, in the courts of this state the issue is one of procedure
and not of substantive right, and the laws of this state are controlling.
This sentence does not appear in the text of the opinion, but the rule was applied.
See Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 538 n.3 (D. Neb. 1976).
91. Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1253-54
(1989) ("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of pro-
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itself, is applicable to a particular claim is to be determined by federal
law, and is ordinarily a matter for an arbitrator rather than a court to
decide.92
B. Grounds For Revocation
Both the Federal Act and the Nebraska Act state that arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable and enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
In defining the roles of federal and state law as to contracts of adhe-
sion, unconscionability, and similar issues, the Supreme Court of the
United States said in a 1987 footnote:
Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that
law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforce-
ability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with this requirement of § 2.... A court may not, then, in assessing the rights
of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a
manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement
would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we
hold today the state legislature cannot.9 3
Given that interpretation, situations may arise where federal law
will preempt the additional statutory limitations on Nebraska agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes. 94 For example, an agreement to
arbitrate a future "claim arising out of personal injury based on con-
tract or tort" might fall within the scope of the federal law. And if the
"voluntarily and willingly" requirements are in addition to those ap-
plicable to Nebraska contracts generally, federal law would preempt
them. Similarly, provisions in installment loan contracts, consumer
credit applications, and credit card applications would be preempted in
agreements covered by the Federal Act if courts interpret the Ne-
cedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according
to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.").
92. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). Quoting
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-78 (1960), the Misco
Court stated:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to
submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making
a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the mov-
ing party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the
arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be de-
prived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all
that it connotes that was bargained for.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987). See also
AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 645, 648-50 (1986).
93. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-73.
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braska statutory language as imposing additional requirements on ar-
bitration agreements, and not merely as reflecting general rules of
contracts of adhesion.9 5 That the drafters placed those requirements
in the second sentence of section 25-2602, and not in the first sentence,
suggests that the requirements "rely on the uniqueness of an agree-
ment to arbitrate" future disputes between the parties, and have a spe-
cial meaning "precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate
[future disputes] is at issue."
C. "Evidencing a Transaction Involving Commerce"
The Federal Act applies to "[a] written provision in... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy .... "96 That language, contained in the 1925 federal en-
actment, was the subject of differing opinions between Justice Fortas
and Justice Black in Prima Paint.
The Prima Paint Corporation acquired a New Jersey paint busi-
ness and hired Flood and Conklin to perform consulting services in
connection with transferring operations from New Jersey to Mary-
land. Justice Fortas' opinion stated:
The consulting agreement was inextricably tied to this interstate transfer and
to the continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling
business. There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a transac-
tion in interstate commerce.9 7
Justice Black responded in dissent:
But in light of the legislative history which indicates that the Act was to have
a limited application to contracts between merchants for the interstate ship-
ment of goods, and in the light of the express failure of Congress to use lan-
guage making the Act applicable to all contracts which "affect commerce," the
statutory language Congress normally uses when it wishes to exercise its full
powers over commerce, I am not at all certain that the Act was intended to
apply to this consulting agreement.9 8
The Court's opinion replies to Justice Black's statements in a foot-
95. Insurance contracts present an additional issue because of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. See infra text accompanying notes 127-31.
96. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See supra note 15 for complete text of statute.
97. 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967). But see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198
(1956)(a suit for breach of an employment contract made in New York, agreeing
to submit any dispute to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association
under New York law). The contract, in Bernhardt, was between a New York
corporation and a New York resident who later moved to Vermont, worked in
Vermont, and was discharged in Vermont. The opinion states:
Nor does this contract evidence "a transaction involving commerce"
within the meaning of § 2 of the Act. There is no showing that petitioner
while performing his duties under the employment contract was work-
ing "in" commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging
in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our decisions.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956).
98. 388 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1967).
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note that the 1924 House Report stated that the commerce power
"reaches not only the actual physical shipment of goods but also con-
tracts relating to interstate commerce." 99 The Court has not yet fur-
ther defined the phrase "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."
Prima Paint has led lower courts to apply what amounts to an "af-
fecting commerce" standard.OO For example, the Act is being inter-
preted to apply to employment agreements of employees with "an
active role in the transactions of an entity engaged in interstate com-
merce."' 0 ' Presumably, the arbitration arrangement, itself, could evi-
dence a transaction in commerce from either its execution or its
implementation.
Two of the recent Nebraska Supreme Court decisions might have
fallen under the Federal Act had the issue been raised. Babb involved
a merger agreement between two UFCW local labor unions covered
by the Labor Management Relations Act. Union members were re-
quired to submit disputes or controversies arising out of the merger to
the UFCW International Executive Committee for a binding decision.
The court held that the Labor Management Relations Act did not gov-
ern an employment suit by an individual against the merged union
99. Id at 401-02 n.7. The majority's complete statement is as follows:
It is suggested in dissent that, despite the absence of any language in
the statute so indicating, we should construe it to apply only to "con-
tracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods." Not
only have we neither the desire nor the warrant so to amend the statute,
but we find persuasive and authoritative evidence of a contrary legisla-
tive intent. See, e.g., the House Report on this legislation which pro-
claims that "[t]he control over interstate commerce [one of the bases for
the legislation] reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment
of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce." H. R. Rep.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924). We note, too, that were the dis-
sent's curious narrowing of the statute correct, there would have been no
necessity for Congress to have amended the statute to exclude certain
kinds of employment contracts. See § 1. In any event, the anomaly
urged upon us in dissent is manifested by the present case. It would be
remarkable to say that a contract for the purchase of a single can of paint
may evidence a transaction in interstate commerce, but that an agree-
ment relating to the facilitation of the purchase of an entire interstate
paint business and its re-establishment and operation in another State is
not.
100. See, e.g., Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249-50 (2d Cir.
1991); Connell v. Meritor Sav. Bank, No. 25715 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27,
1991)(WESTLAW Allfed library, Dist file); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond F. &
P.R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (D.D.C. 1981).
101. Connell v. Meritor Sav. Bank, No. 25715 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1991)(WESTLAW
Allfed library, Dist file). See also, e.g., Burke County Pub. Schools v. Shaver
Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 413-20, 279 S.E.2d 816, 819-23 (1981). See also supra
note 100.
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under the merger agreement. 0 2 The applicability of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act does not appear to have been considered in the litigation.
Overland Constructors involved a $1,672,500 construction contract
for a new school. The contract documents contained an arbitration
clause which provided that the architect would decide disputes be-
tween the parties. Although a construction contract can be subject to
the Federal Act,103 the issue was not raised by the parties in Overland
Constructors and the court's decision was based solely on Nebraska
law.
D. Choice Of Laws
Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees O4 involved a con-
struction contract with an arbitration clause covering "all disputes be-
tween the parties" and a choice of laws clause that "[t]he Contract
shall be governed by the law of the place where the project is lo-
cated."' 05 In response to the Board's suit for fraud and breach of con-
tract, Volt sought to compel arbitration. The Board resisted the order
to compel arbitration pending the outcome of claims against third par-
ties involved in the design and management of the project. A provi-
sion in the California Code of Civil Procedure stated that a court may
stay arbitration pending the outcome of a court action when "[a] party
to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or
special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transac-
4ion or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of con-
flicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact...."106
In holding the California procedural rules to be applicable, the
Court stated: "Congress' principal purpose [was] ensuring that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms."107 But
the Court held that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agree-
102. 233 Neb. 826, 830-32, 448 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1989).
103. Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989)(installation
of a system of conduits on the Stanford University campus); Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)(construction of additions
to the hospital building). See Burke County Pub. Schools v. Shaver Partnership,
303 N.C. 408, 417, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (1981)(An architectural "service contract
which contemplates substantial interstate activity is a contract evidencing a
transaction in commerce within the meaning of the act.").
104. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
105. Id. at 1251. The choice of laws provisions were contained in a standard form con-
tract of the American Institute of Architects incorporated in the construction
contract. Id. at 1256.
106. Id. at 1251.
107. Id at 1255.
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ments to arbitrate."'108
It would seem that delaying arbitration until after third party law-
suits, "arising out of ... [a] series of related transactions," limits the
enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate. The Court held, how-
ever, that the parties had agreed to such delays by choosing California
law to govern the contract. The parties did not dispute whether they
had chosen California law to apply to the arbitration. They litigated
the issue of preemption rather than choice of laws. It would appear
from the decision that rules for the interpretation of a choice of laws
clause are the same on arbitration issues as on other contract
provisions.
Thus, if a contract subject to the Federal Act specifies that Ne-
braska law applies, the Federal Act would control the general deter-
mination of validity and enforceability, but Nebraska law would
control the arbitration procedures. Under both the Federal Act'0 9 and
the Nebraska Act,110 the parties can contractually specify the proce-
dural rules for conducting the arbitration.
If Nebraska contract law applies by virtue of general conflicts of
laws rules rather than by the parties' express choice of laws, both the
Nebraska Act and the Federal Act are potentially applicable. There
do not appear to be substantial procedural differences between the
Acts. A Nebraska court having jurisdiction of a matter would apply
the Nebraska Act to procedural issues, including review and enforce-
ment of an award.'1 , A federal court having jurisdiction of a matter
would apply the Federal Act provisions to procedural issues.
E. Relationship To Other Federal Statutes
Whether claims under other federal statutes can be made subject
108. Id at 1254.
109. Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and par-
ties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they
see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, .. . so too may they specify by contract the rules under which
the arbitration will be conducted. Where, as here, the parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules accord-
ing to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the
FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would
otherwise permit it to go forward.
Id- at 1255 (citation omitted).
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602 (1989) provides: "Contract provisions agreed to by the
parties shall control over contrary provisions of the Uniform Act."
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2613(a)(1989) is virtually identical to 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) as
to the grounds for vacating an award. A state law provision allowing full judicial
review of an arbitration award, however, would undoubtedly offend the Federal
Act.
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to arbitration by agreement depends upon Congressional intention." 2
The Federal Act, itself, applies generally to agreements to arbitrate
federal statutory claims, but subject to whatever statutory or clear pol-
icy limitations Congress may impose.113 The Court has recently sus-
tained the adequacy of the Federal Act's procedural provisions to
adjudicate an individual's Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") claim.114 It has also rejected arguments that employment
agreements are inherently the product of unequal bargaining power to
such an extent that they are unenforceable under section 2 of the Fed-
eral Act.115 Recent amendments to the ADEA impose stringent re-
quirements for the waiver of any right or claim under the Act."l 6
112. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991). See Shear-
son/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987):
The Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory di-
rective, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary
congressional command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitra-
tion, however, to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
113. See discussion in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652
(1991) and Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917,
1919-20 (1989).
114. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1654-55 (1991).
115. Id at 1655-56.
116. Act of October 16,1990, Pub. L. (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 1985 &
Supp. 1991) 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 983-984 (October 16, 1990) which states:
(f)(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act
unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Except as provided in para-
graph (2), a waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless
at a minimum-
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the
employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by such
individual, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this
Act;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after
the date the waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consid-
eration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is
entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney
prior to executing the agreement;
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which
to consider the agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or
other employment termination program offered to a group or class of em-
ployees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to
consider the agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days follow-
ing the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agree-
ment, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until
the revocation period has expired;
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or
other employment termination program offered to a group or class of em-
1991]
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F. State Claims Other Than Breach Of Contract
Perry v. Thomas 117 held that a stockbroker's breach of employ-
ment contract claim was arbitrable under the Federal Act, despite a
California wage claim statute to the contrary. The Court noted, but
declined to rule on, the issue of whether ancillary claims for conver-
sion, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty were arbitrable
with, or severable from, the breach of contract claim.118 On remand,
the California Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue.119 But later
California decisions have held claims of securities firm employees
under state age discrimination2O and overtime pay12 1 statutes to be
arbitrable by virtue of the reasoning in Perry v. Thomas.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Swenson v.
Management Recruiters International 122 that an arbitration provision
in an individual employment contract, covered by the Federal Act,
ployees, the employer (at the commencement of the period specified in
subparagraph (F)) informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated
to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to-
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such pro-
gram, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits ap-
plicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for
the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classifica-
tion or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the
program.
(2) A waiver in settlement of a charge filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, or an action filed in court by the individ-
ual or the individual's representative, alleging age discrimination of a
kind prohibited under section 4 or 15 may not be considered knowing
and voluntary unless at a minimum-
(A) subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1) have been met;
and
(B) the individual is given a reasonable period of time within which to
consider the settlement agreement.
(3) In any dispute that may arise over whether any of the require-
ments, conditions, and circumstances set forth in subparagraph (A), (B),
(C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of paragraph (1), or subparagraph (A) or
(B) of paragraph (2), have been met, the party asserting the validity of a
waiver shall have the burden of proving in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to paragraph (1)
or (2).
(4) No waiver agreement may affect the Commission's rights and re-
sponsibilities to enforce this Act. No waiver may be used to justify inter-
fering with the protected right of an employee to file a charge or
participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the
Commission.
117. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
118. Id. at 492.
119. Thomas v. Perry, 200 Cal. App. 3d 510, 246 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1988).
120. Hall v. Nomura Sec. Int'l, 219 Cal. App. 3d 43, 268 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1990).
121. Baker v. Aubry, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 265 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1989).
122. 858 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 872 F.2d 264 (1988), cer denied, 110 S.
Ct. 143 (1989).
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could not be applied to a Title VII claim or a claim under the "paral-
lel" Minnesota Human Rights Act. But the court also held that the
employee's state law claims for invasion of privacy and tortious con-
version of the contents of her mail were arbitrable. With respect to
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the court stressed that it based its
holding upon congressional intent in passing Title VII and not upon
the state legislative intent in enacting the Minnesota Human Rights
Act.123
Taken at face value, this reasoning could mean that an arbitration
clause in a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,
which provides for arbitration of state workers' compensation claims,
would preempt the specific statutory prohibition in section 25-2602.124
But such a clause is probably invalid as a "scheme, artifice, or device"
to avoid the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, 2 5 which would,
under both the Federal Act and the Nebraska Act, be one of "such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
The statutory exclusion in section 25-2602 for a future "claim arising
out of personal injury based on contract or tort", however, seems quite
likely to be preempted by an arbitration provision covered by the Fed-
eral Act. In that situation, there is no state "scheme, artifice, or de-
vice" statute, and no specialized tribunal like the workers'
compensation court having exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. The
provision in the Nebraska Act on personal injury claims "takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue."126
G. Business of Insurance
Insofar as Nebraska might, within its general contract rules, treat
an arbitration clause in an insurance agreement as a "contract of adhe-
sion,"M7 the agreement would be outside of the protection of the Fed-
eral Act. If, however, Nebraska's legislative invalidation of that
provision was not upon "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract," the Nebraska determination would
conflict with the Federal Act and be preempted by its substantive
provisions.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states: "No Act of Congress shall be
123. Id. at 1309 ("We emphasize that we reach this holding based upon the legislative
history and congressional intent manifested by Congress in passing Title VII.
The intent of the state legislature in passing the Minnesota Human Rights Act
[citation omitted] is not relevant to our holding.").
124. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2602 (1989)("A claim for workers' compensation shall not be
subject to arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act.").
125. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-116 (1988).
126. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
127. See Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 232 Neb. 418, 441 N.W.2d 143 (1989)(Fahrnbruch,
J., dissenting, joined by White, J. and Grant, J.).
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construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."' 2 8 The
"future disputes" sentence in section 25-2602 adds to "such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract": "[i]f the
provision (a) is entered into voluntarily and willingly and (b) is not a
part of a contract of adhesion, such as a standard installment loan con-
tract, a consumer credit application, or an insurance contract except as
provided in section 44-811 [relating to assessment associations]."
It is not clear whether that language in section 25-2602 falls within
the terms of the Federal Act ("such grounds as exist at law or in eq-
uity for the revocation of any contract") or the McCarran-Ferguson
Act ("law enacted .. for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance"). There is authority that general state arbitration statutes
are not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance, but rather for the purpose of allowing parties to agree to resolve
contract disputes nonjudcially.12 9 The Nebraska statute, however,
contains specific language concerning "future disputes" arising under
an insurance contract and thus is arguably distinguishable from that
authority.
It appears unlikely that arbitration provisions in primary Nebraska
insurance policies130 will be enforceable. Treated under general con-
tract principles concerning revocability or "contracts of adhesion,"
there is no conflict between section 25-2602 and the Federal Act. The
drafters apparently referred to "insurance contract" in section 25-2602
in order to regulate one of the key aspects of the "business of insur-
ance,"lSl that of insurer and insured relationships. Treated as a spe-
cial law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, this aspect of section 25-2602 would be protected by the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act from the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.
H. "Seamen, Railroad Employees, or Any Other Class of Workers
Engaged in Commerce"
Section 2 of the Federal Act states that the Act applies to "a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Section 1 states
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(1988).
129. See, e.g., Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp.
455, 460 (D. Kan. 1990); Triton Lines v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass'n, 707
F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D. Texas 1989).
130. The context of the term "insurance contract" in Section 25-2602 would indicate a
primary insurance policy rather than a reinsurance agreement or other contract
relating to insurance. See Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins.
Co., 750 F. Supp. 455 (D. Kan. 1990).
131. For discussions of the term '%usiness of insurance," see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeau, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205 (1979).
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that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."
Although enacted in 1925, the general applicability language in sec-
tion 2 has come to approximate the "affecting commerce" standard
contained in later federal statutes.3 2 The "any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" exclusionary language in
section 1 has yet to be definitively interpreted and coordinated with
the language in section 2.
The United States Supreme Court expressly avoided a determina-
tion of the full scope of the section 1 exclusion in Gilmer v. Interstate!"
Johnson Lane Corp.,133 for the reasons that the issue had not been
raised by the parties in the lower courts and that the arbitration re-
quirement was contained in a New York Stock Exchange rule rather
than an employment agreement. Neither the parties nor the Court
raised the issue in Perry v. Thomas,13 4 in connection with an earlier
claim by an individual securities representative. The issue was
avoided in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,13 5 following a determination
132. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
133. 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651-52 n.2 (1991)(citations omitted), which states:
Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1. Several amid curiae in support of Gilmer argue that that
section excludes from the coverage of the FAA all "contracts of employ-
ment." Gilmer, however, did not raise the issue in the courts below, it
was not addressed there, and it was not among the questions presented
in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would be inappropriate to
address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause be-
ing enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment. The
FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The record before us does not show, and the parties
do not contend, that Gilmer's employment agreement with Interstate
contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at
issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application, which is a contract
with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts ad-
dressing the issue uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause
in § 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such
registration applications. We implicitly assumed as much in Perry v.
Thomas, where we held that the FAA required a former employee of a
securities firm to arbitrate his statutory wage claim against his former
employer, pursuant to an arbitration clause in his registration applica-
tion. Unlike the dissent,... we choose to follow the plain language of
the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold that § l's
exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement.
Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae.
134. 482 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1987).
135. 350 U.S. 198, 201 n.3 (1956):
Since no transaction involving commerce appears to be involved here,
we do not reach the further question whether in any event petitioner
would be included in "any other class of workers" within the exceptions
of § 1 of the Act.
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that there was no "transaction involving commerce" under section 2.
And the statutory language was substantially misquoted in an explan-
atory footnote in Paperworkers v. Misco,136 which involved a collective
bargaining agreement.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Gilmer be-
cause the "arbitration clauses contained in employment agreements
are specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA"137 and "that com-
pulsory arbitration conflicts with the congressional purpose animating
the ADEA, in particular." 3 8 The dissenting opinion relies upon early
judicial interpretations of the Federal Act, legislative history of enact-
ment of the Federal Act, and the bargaining relationships of employ-
ers and individual employees as to conditions of employment.139 That
interpretation, however, treats the section 1 exclusion as if it states
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
workers affecting foreign or interstate commerce." It effectively
deletes the language "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of" and converts "engaged in" to "affecting."
There are federal court holdings that the section 1 exclusion ap-
plies to "only those other classes of workers who are actually engaged
in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so
closely related thereto as to be in practical effect a part of it."140 This
interpretation stems from the legislative history of the enactment and
the context of the statutory language, both of which indicate a cate-
gory of employees engaged in the movement of persons or goods in
interstate commerce. It comports with the Court's statements that
See supra note 97. The lower court held that Bernhardt was not within the sec-
tion 1 exclusion because the "plaintiff was not hired as a 'worker' but as a plant
superintendent, at a salary of $15,000 a year, with managerial duties fundamen-
tally different from those of 'workers.'" 218 F.2d 948, 951-52 (2d Cir. 1955).
136. 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). The footnote omits the words "seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of," stating merely that the Act "does not apply to
'contracts of employment of... workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce."' See Harry Hoffman Printing v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union
Local 261, 912 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1990); American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 211, 215 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).
137. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657 (1991)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). The dissent also reasoned that the exclusion
in section 1 is not limited to "agreements entitled 'Contract of Employment' "and
that "§ 1 should be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbi-
trate disputes with the employer arising out of the employment relationship, par-
ticularly where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment." I&
at 1659.
138. Id. at 1660.
139. Id- at 1658-60.
140. Tenney Eng'g v. United Elect. Workers Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
See, e.g., Hydrick v. Management Recruiters Int'l, 738 F. Supp. 1434, 1435 (N.D.
Ga. 1990); Home v. New England Patriots, 489 F. Supp. 465, 469 (D. Mass. 1980).
See also cases cited infra note 142.
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"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration."14' The interpretation sug-
gests that the language may come to mean a class of workers engaged
in interstate transportation "for hire." 42 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that postal workers fell under the exclusion,
stating that the concern is "not whether the individual worker actu-
ally engaged in interstate commerce, but whether the class of workers
to which the complaining worker belonged engaged in interstate
commerce."143
The exclusionary language of section 1 can easily be reconciled
with the basic coverage language of the Federal Act in section 2.
There are simply two different standards'44 which are applied for sep-
arate purposes. Section 2 requires, in effect, that for the Federal Act
to apply, the situation must be one "affecting commerce." Section 1
excludes from such coverage contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees and any other class of workers engaged in the move-
ment of persons or goods in foreign or interstate commerce for hire.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nebraska has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act with modifica-
tions concerning agreements to arbitrate "future disputes." It is not
clear how much change, if any, there will be from prior Nebraska law.
Nebraska arbitration awards, as distinguished from executory
agreements to arbitrate, have been judicially enforceable in the past.
There is an indication that the Nebraska Supreme Court will sustain
the constitutionality of the statutory provisions on agreements to arbi-
141. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991)(quoting
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
142. See, e.g., Connell v. Meritor Say. Bank, No. 25715 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27,
1991)(WESTLAW, Allfed library, Dist file)('"The exclusions provided by Section
one apply only to the employment contracts of workers actually engaged in the
interstate transportation industry."); Elgart v. Sono-Tek Corp., No. 88-7593 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 9, 1989)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)("Moreover, the phrase 'any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' in section 1 has
been narrowly construed to apply only to transportation workers."); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972)("Erving
clearly is not involved in the transportation industry."); General Warehousemen
Local 767 v. Standard Brands, 579 F.2d 1282, 1294 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978)("actually
engaged in the transportation industry"); Malisian v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 654
F. Supp. 101, 103 (W.D.N.C. 1987)("in transportation industries").
143. Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 1988). See
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473
(11th Cir. 1987).
144. See Cox, Grievance Arbitration In The Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. REV. 591, 599
(1954)(pre-Lincoln Mills analysis concerning the competing interests of arbitra-
tion versus judicial intervention of grievances arising under a collective bargain-
ing agreement).
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trate "existing controversies," although no Nebraska Supreme Court
holding has actually enforced such an agreement against an attempt to
revoke prior to an award. The "future disputes" provisions of the stat-
utes appear likely to be held unconstitutional and unenforceable
under the Nebraska Constitution. Any rules concerning the submis-
sion by the parties of an "existing controversy" to arbitration, pursu-
ant to a written "future disputes" agreement, are wholly unclear from
the court's jumbled analysis in recent decisions.
The Federal Arbitration Act is a valuable but unappreciated source
of substantive authority for valid, irrevocable and enforceable Ne-
braska arbitration agreements. Contracts "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce" (for practical purposes, "affecting commerce"),
which contain arbitration provisions, preempt state law limitations on
the enforceability of arbitration arrangements.
V. EPILOGUE
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Nebraska Associa-
tion of Public Employees145 "that (1) provisions in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 25-2601 et seq. (Reissue 1989) authorizing binding arbitration of fu-
ture disputes, and (2) clauses in contracts providing for binding arbi-
tration of future disputes, violate Neb. Const. art. I, § 13."146 The
constitutional open court provision states that "[a]ll courts shall be
open, and every person, for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have a remedy by due course of law, and
justice administered without denial or delay."147 The result was
clearly predictable from long standing judicial precedents and the
Opinion of the Attorney General issued during legislative considera-
tion of the 1987 enactment.148
The parties to state public employment collective bargaining agree-
ments included arbitration provisions covering disputes and griev-
ances which might arise thereafter. When a grievance arose, the State
reneged, revoked its agreement to submit disputes between the parties
to arbitration, and brought a declaratory judgment action.149 The
supreme court decision invalidating the statute and contractual arbi-
tration provision affirmed the determination of the District Court for
Lancaster County.150
The court dealt with the issue of waiver of constitutional rights by
quoting from a 1902 decision that "whenever we say that the jurisdic-
tion of courts may be contracted away in advance on any question, we
145. 239 Neb. 653, 477 N.W.2d 577 (1991).
146. 1& at 654-55, 477 N.W.2d at 580.
147. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
148. See supra notes 1-6 and 51-54 and accompanying text.
149. 239 Neb. at 656, 477 N.W.2d at 581.
150. See supra notes 9 and 54.
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open a leak in the dyke of constitutional guarantees which might some
day carry all away."15 1 The opinion calls "irrelevant" the legislative
declaration of a public policy in favor of arbitration. 52 It is apparent
that only judicial determinations can ascertain or define the nature of
"public policy" inherent in the Nebraska Constitution. The facts in
this case presented both a legislative determination of "public policy"
and the executive branch's policy determination in "voluntarily and
willingly" agreeing to have contractual collective bargaining agree-
ment disputes settled by arbitration.
The decision does not acknowledge or consider the statutory re-
strictions added by the 1987 Legislature to the "future disputes" provi-
sions in section 25-2602 in an effort to comply with the Nebraska
constitutional requirements.153 The statutory provisions for "volunta-
rily and willingly" and "not a part of a contract of adhesion" were
intended to alleviate the rationale upon which the prior judicial prece-
dents were grounded. 5 4 They were designed to provide criteria for
the waiver or limitation of a constitutional right by the affected par-
ties. There is no analysis in the decision of any present day "public
policy" with respect to the arbitrability of grievances arising under
public employment collective bargaining statutes and agreements. In
this respect, the decision may forecast a very restrictive attitude of the
supreme court toward other forms of alternative dispute resolution in
Nebraska.
Having held the statute unconstitutional on the basis of judicial
precedent, the court moved to an issue of whether the State was "equi-
tably estopped from challenging the validity and enforceability of the
arbitration clauses in the contract."'155 One inference from this analy-
sis seems to be that even though both the statute and the contractual
arbitration provisions are "unconstitutional," the parties may, never-
theless, be equitably estopped156 from denying the unconstitutionality
151. 239 Neb. at 658, 477 N.W.2d at 582, (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb.
584, 588, 92 N.W. 736, 737 (1902)).
152. Id at 659,477 N.W.2d at 582. The open court provisions are continued in Article I,
Bill of Rights, and not in Article V, Judicial, of the Nebraska Constitution. Both
the state collective bargaining law and the arbitration act involve legislatively
established rights. Despite some apparently conflicting prior results, this decision
clearly assumes that all statutory rights are subject to the open court provisions.
That analysis would seem to invalidate several other statutes allowing arbitra-
tion. See supm notes 81-82 and 85 and accompanying text. It might also be noted
that the open court provisions, traceable to the Magna Carta, do not, themselves,
require enforceable contracts with, or tort actions against, the State of Nebraska.
153. I at 655, 477 N.W.2d at 580 (quoting as "relevant" only the general language
making the agreement "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable").
154. See supra notes 56, 63-66 and 70-73 and related text.
155. Id- at 659, 477 N.W.2d at 582.
156. Id at 659-60, 477 N.W.2d at 582 (citations omitted):
The elements of equitable estoppel are, as to the party estopped, (1) con-
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of the statute and agreement. The court was able to deal with the
equitable estoppel argument easily on the record in this case since the
parties had expressly signed a separate agreement reserving the right
of the Attorney General to "file a legal action seeking to resolve the
constitutionality issue" and stating that "the Union agrees to serve as
defendant in such law suit and to pay the costs of defending such law
suit."15 7
The decision does nothing to clarify the question whether a "future
disputes" agreement can become an "existing controversy" agreement
by action of the parties after a dispute arises.158 The opinion is care-
fully limited to "future disputes". But it also states that "the citizen
cannot be held to have bartered that [valid and subsisting cause of ac-
tion] away by any agreement made before a controversy arises."159
Thus, there remain two significant issues with respect to standard
agreements to arbitrate "future disputes". One involves the circum-
stances, if any,160 in which the actions of a party to a "future disputes"
arbitration agreement might constitute an equitable estoppel. The
other is whether actions of the parties pursuant to "unconstitutional"
"future disputes" statutes and contractual provisions can somehow
resurrect the arbitration clause as an "existing controversy" agree-
ment, or can otherwise constitute a separate binding agreement to
submit an existing controversy to arbitration.
The court appears to have missed the main thrust of the Associa-
tion's argument concerning judicial review of an arbitrator's decision.
The court found it "unnecessary for us to consider" that issue since
the agreement to arbitrate future disputes was held to be unconstitu-
tional.161 The argument, however, appears to have been directed to
the proposition that a "meaningful" judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision can constitute compliance with the constitutional open court
duct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material
facts or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expecta-
tion, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other
party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
real facts; as to the other party, (4) lack of knowledge and of the means
of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (5) reliance, in good
faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (6)
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detri-
ment, or prejudice.
157. Id. at 656, 477 N.W.2d at 580 (quoting the separate letter of agreement required by
the State prior to execution of the collective bargaining agreement).
158. See supna notes 3-6 and accompanying text and notes 32-34 and accompanying and
following text.
159. 239 Neb. at 658, 477 N.W.2d at 582.
160. See supra note 156 (stating the requirements for an equitable estoppel).
161. Id. at 660, 477 N.W.2d at 583.
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requirements. The Attorney General's Opinion to the Legislature ad-
dressed this issue directly and concluded that the statutory standards
for judicial review of an arbitration decision "are so narrow as to effec-
tively deny parties to the arbitration the assistance of the courts."
1 62
Either the court did not understand the Association's argument to
have been made in that sense or there is implicit in the decision a
holding that judicial review alone could never be accepted as compli-
ance with the open court requirements.
162. See supra note 53 (quoting this portion of the Attorney General's Opinion).
1991]
